Does relative deprivation condition the effects of social protection programs on political attitudes? Experimental evidence from Pakistan

Abstract

Why might citizens fail to reward incumbents for providing private goods? While extant literature on the political consequences of targeted government welfare programs has focused on attribution challenges and low levels of civic education and engagement, we offer an additional explanation related to perceived inequality, or the feeling that one is poor relative to other citizens. Leveraging a regression discontinuity design and a survey experiment, we identify the causal effects of a large cash transfer program in Pakistan when relative deprivation is and is not pronounced. When relative deprivation is not salient, we find that cash transfers have little effect on attitudes toward government. However, when relative deprivation is salient, those receiving cash transfers experience increased support for their political leaders and institutions, while those denied transfers become more politically disgruntled. This has important implications for our understanding of the political ramifications of rising inequality and social protection programs.